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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Court has requested that briefs of amici 
curiae address whether an employer may, consistent 
with Section 152A of Chapter 149 of the General Laws, 
impose a no-tipping policy at his establishment, not 
only effectively discouraging patrons from leaving 
tips for his wait staff employees but also actually 
prohibiting employees from accepting tips. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Amici adopt the Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts as presented by Mr. Ron Meshna and 
the other Plaintiff-Appellants. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No-tipping policies are prohibited by the 
Massachusetts Tips Act, Mass. Gen. ch. 149, §152A 
(hereinafter "Tips Act"). No provision of the Tips Act 
can be construed to permit employers to enact 
workplace rules that place covered workers beyond the 
reach of a law intended to protect their right to 
receive tips customarily offered to them by patrons. 
See Mass . Gen. Laws ch. 149, §152A(a) (establishing 
that tips are "given [by patrons] as an acknowledgment 
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of any service performed by a wait staff employee, 
service employee, or service bartender"). Pp. 9-11 
No-tipping policies are inconsistent with the 
Tips Act's definition of tips, which indicates that 
tips are a portion of covered employees' wages that 
are determined by a voluntary social norm, to wit, the 
custom of tipping. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 
§152A(a) (tips are "given [by patrons] as an 
acknowledgment of any service performed by a wait 
staff employee. ."). A construction of the Tips Act 
that makes the receipt of patron tips covered workers 
"employer-optional" would impermissibly require this 
Court to add words to the statute that the Legislature 
did not include and to disregard the Legislature's 
considered judgment that this law be interpreted 
sensibly. Pp. 11-16. 
Employer-imposed no-tipping policies cannot be 
squared with the express terms of §152A(g}, which 
states that "[n]o employer or person shall by a 
special contract with an employee or by any other 
means exempt itself from this section." Scrivanos' 
tipping-ban is a special contract that unlawfully 
exempts its establishments from complying with the 
Tips Act. Neither the Defendants nor the Superior 
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Court below referenced or attempted to reconcile 
employer no-tipping policies with §152A(g), which was 
designed by the Legislature to thwart a wide range of 
employer schemes that are put in place to avoid 
compliance with or to create an "end run" around the 
Tips Act. Defendants are asking this Court, in effect, 
to amend the Tips Act. That is clearly a prerogative 
of the Legislature. Pp. 18-23. 
This Court should reject the argument that no-
tipping policies are a rational business response to 
some customers who find tipping contrary to their 
personal viewpoint. First, this rationale for 
instituting a no-tipping policy ignores record facts 
showing that many customers at Defendants' Dunkin' 
Donuts stores favored tipping and exercised their 
right to tip workers even when no-tipping signs were 
prominent. Second, Defendants' contention that it is 
not customary to offer gratuities to coffee servers is 
contrary to the record, historical practice, and 
current data showing that many patrons favor tipping 
in quick service coffee establishments. Scrivanos' no-
tipping policy should therefore be rejected as an 
effort to repurpose the Tips Act to serve private 
employer interests that are contrary to the 
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Legislature's public policy objective - ensuring that 
wait staff receive tips and gratuities intended for 
them by customers they serve. Pp. 23-28. 
Third, allowing employers covered by the Tips Act 
the unfettered right to create no-tipping zones will 
have adverse consequences for low-wage workers and the 
Commonwealth. Banning tipping will depress the already 
meager income of thousands of low-wage front-line food 
service workers. Legitimating Defendants' policy would 
also increase the number of low-wage workers who are 
compelled to rely on federal and state public 
assistance programs to meet basic food and housing 
needs, placing unnecessary burdens on Massachusetts 
taxpayers. P. 29. 
Plaintiffs are representative of a sub-set of 
workers who hold jobs at the bottom of the 21st century 
labor market. The fast-food sector, with profits of 
more than $7.4 billion in 2013, operates on a high-
profit/low-wage business model that employs over 2.2 
million low-wage workers. These employees experience 
high rates of under-employment and earn incomes that 
cannot provide a family with a living wage in major 
urban areas like Boston. 
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Because tips make a real difference in income for 
these workers - raising wages by 15% or more - no-
tipping policies will tend to push more working people 
into poverty and burden taxpayers who underwrite the 
cost of social safety net programs. Almost $7 billion 
is spent yearly to underwrite the cost of federal 
public assistance programs for fast-food workers. P. 
29-38. 
This disproportionate reliance on public 
assistance is accompanied by an inordinately high-rate 
of non-compliance with wage and hour law in the fast-
food sector. Indeed, the Defendants' practices of 
throwing tips into the garbage and using tips to cover 
purported cash register shortages is part and parcel 
of the low-road practices that the Tips Act and other 
wage and hour laws are designed to combat. P. 39-41. 
Finally, Defendants' no-tipping policy is 
irrational from an economic standpoint. The Superior 
Court judge indicated that the no-tipping policy 
prevented Defendants from remaining competitive with 
other quick-service coffee establishments that permit 
tipping and comply with the Tips Act. What's more, 
there is no record evidence or social science 
literature indicating that that economic realities or 
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competitive pressures 'push' employers like Defendants 
to engage in the illegal behavior at issue. Pp. 41-42 
No-tipping policies serve no rational public 
purpose and conflict with the language and public 
purpose underlying the Tips Act. The Court should 
therefore find that Defendants' no-tipping policies 
are impermissible under the Tips Act. Pp. 42-44. 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI 
The University of Massachusetts Labor Relations 
and Research Center ("Center"), founded in 1964, as an 
integrated program of graduate education, research, 
and direct service to workers and the labor movement. 
A primary concern addressed by the Labor Center's 
research and educational missions is the decline of 
collective bargaining and the rise of inequality that 
has accompanied the rapid growth of precarious forms 
of non-standard and contingent employment. To this 
end, the Center initiated a Future of Work Project in 
2004 to provide labor and government policy-makers 
with fact-driven research that examines the growth of 
the low-wage, contingent labor force as well as the 
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economic and technological forces that are driving 
this development. 
The Labor Center, along with labor centers at 
other University of Massachusetts campuses, has funded 
research and published a series of books and reports 
on the future of work. The Center also sponsored 
numerous conferences attended by hundreds of labor 
advocates and government officials where these issues 
were discussed and debated. 
The Future of Work Project complements two other 
of the Center's research areas. A Labor-Community 
Research Project explores how unions and community-
based groups can mobilize in partnership to address 
labor market shifts, plant-closings, subcontracting, 
with particular emphasis on how these problems impact 
low-wage workers, persons of color, women and 
immigrants. The Center has also developed a strategic 
corporate research program allows unions and their 
allies to efficiently access and analyze comprehensive 
corporate business data to facilitate their responses 
the shifting terrain in which labor union organizing 
and collective bargaining are taking place . 
The Massachusetts Fair Wage Campaign ("FWC") is a 
coalition of non-profit immigrants' and workers' 
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rights organizations that engage in a range of legal 
and policy advocacy, community organizing, and support 
and referrals for legal action for low-wage immigrant 
workers in Massachusetts. Most of the FWC 
organizations are community-based groups that work 
closely with low-wage immigrant workers who are 
victims of exploitative and abusive employment 
practices, including nonpayment of wages and violation 
of state and federal minimum wage and overtime laws, 
as well as the Massachusetts tips law. Greater Boston 
Legal Services ("GBLS"), counsel to these 
organizations, provides legal representation and 
assistance to the organizations in their ongoing 
efforts to advise and support workers in the 
enforcement of their workplace rights. GBLS also 
brings to its representation of the FWC organizations 
its own extensive experience representing low-wage 
workers in a wide range of cases under the 
Massachusetts wage laws. 
The participating FWC organizations are the 
Brazilian Immigrant Center, Brazilian Women's Group, 
Centro Presente, Chelsea Collaborative, Chinese 
Progressive Association, Justice at Work, 
Massachusetts Coalition for Occupational Safety and 
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Health (MassCOSH), Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee 
Advocacy Coalition (MIRA), Massachusetts Jobs with 
Justice, and Metrowest Worker Center. 
ARGUMENT 
Employer-imposed no-tipping policies that prevent 
wait staff and covered service employees from 
receiving tips or gratuities from patrons are at odds 
with the Massachusetts Tips Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
149, §152A, and undermine its legislative purpose. 
Employer-mandated no-tipping rules also have hidden 
social costs that contribute to fast-food workers and 
over-the-counter wait staff like the Plaintiffs 
relying on taxpayer-funded public benefit programs at 
twice the rate of other employed workers. 
I. EMPLOYER NO-TIPPING POLICIES ARE PROHIBITED BY 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE TIPS ACT AND ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC POLICIES THAT GUIDE 
THE LEGISLATURE'S ENACTMENT OF WAGE AND HOUR LAWS 
The Tips Act expressly protects the wages and 
tips of three groups of non-supervisory employees: 1) 
"wait staff" who work in restaurants, banquet 
facilities or "other places where food or beverages 
are served;" 2) "service bartenders" who prepare 
beverages served by wait staff, as well as; 3) other 
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"service employees" who provide services directly to 
customers and customarily receive tips or gratuities. 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §152A(a); DiFiore v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 492 (2009). 
There is no dispute as to Plaintiffs' status as 
protected employees under §152A(a) of the Tips Act. 
Defendants nevertheless argue that an employer can 
lawfully prevent the Plaintiffs and other covered 
employees from receiving tips from patrons by enacting 
a no-tipping policy at its Dunkin' Donuts outlets. 
Scrivanos Brief at 19-20. Defendants' illogical 
construction of the Tips Act cannot be squared with 
the salient provisions of this law, the rules of 
statutory construction this Court has adopted to 
determine the meaning of remedial statutory schemes, 
or the legislative purpose of the Tips Act. 
A. Employer-Imposed Tipping Bans Are in 
Conflict with the Tips Act's Definitions of 
Protected Employees and Tips Voluntarily 
Offered Patrons 
Nothing in the text of §152A(a) of the Tips Act 
, allows employees who fall within the ambit of this 
statute to be removed from its protections by 
employers who proclaim that their food service 
establishment is a no-tipping zone. Yet, Scrivanos 
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contends otherwise, asserting that "in those contexts 
in which employers choose to prohibit tipping, the 
employees do not customarily receive tips and, 
therefore, do not fall within the protection of the 
statute." Scrivanos Brief at 19-20. 
The purported legality of employer-imposed no-
tipping policies hinge on the illogical proposition 
that the Tips Act's statutory mandates are employer-
optional and may be completely disregarded whenever an 
employer imposes a no-tipping rule on its protected 
workforce. Such a reading of the Tips Act, however, 
disregards the "Legislature's considered judgment" 
that the Tips Act be interpreted sensibly. See 
DiFiore, 486 Mass. at 490) (further citations omitted) 
("rejecting unreasonable interpretations unless clear 
meaning of the statutory language requires such an 
interpretation"). 
Section 152A(a), which defines who is a covered 
employee and employer, does not cede to employers the 
right to determine whether a covered employee is 
entitled to receive tips customarily offered by 
patrons. Scrivanos' argument - that tipping bans are 
consistent with the Act - disregards this definition, 
which explains that tips are a portion of a covered 
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employee's wage determined by a voluntary social norm, 
i.e., by custom, not employer policy. 1 This is clear 
from the text of §152A(a), which provides that tips are 
"given [by patrons] as an acknowledgment of any 
service performed by a wait staff employee, service 
employee, or service bartender." 
The Tips Act cannot be sensibly construed to 
allow employer no-tipping policies without ignoring 
the fact that the Legislature designed the Act to 
"ensure that" protected employees "receive the tips, 
gratuities, and service charges that customers intend 
for them to receive." DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 491 
(emphasis added) . The Legislature enacted the Tips Act 
not only to prevent employers from "demanding, 
accepting or requesting tips" [. .] "given to" wait 
staff by patrons, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §152A(a), 
but also to preclude employers from enacting policies 
that preemptively interfere with a patron's intended 
1 The Act is intended to protect the customary practice of 
patron tipping for all non-supervisory wait staff 
employees, service bartenders and also for service 
employees who "provide services directly to customers or 
consumers" but work in occupations "other than in food or 
beverage service where "employees customarily receive tips 
or gratuities." Mass. Gen . Laws ch. 149, §152A(a). 
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offer of a tip or gratuity to a protected employee. 
See DiFiore~ 454 Mass. at 491. 
Remedial statutes such as the Tips Act and the 
other fair labor standards codified in Chapter 149 of 
the General Laws, are to be liberally construed "with 
some imagination as to the purposes which lie behind 
them." DePianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int '1. , Inc., 
465 Mass . 607, 620 (2013) (quoting Lehigh Valley Coal 
Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F.547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. 
denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915)). It is therefore 
unimaginable that the Legislature enacted a law that 
is designed to ensure that protected workers receive 
the tips and gratuities intended for them, but also 
allowed for a silent, unwritten provision that permits 
employers to opt-out of the law simply by posting a 
sign in their establishment that proclaims, "Thank You 
For Not Tipping." See Memorandum of Decision and Order 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, SUCV2011-
01849-BLS1 at 11 (J. Billings Sept. 11, 2013). 
Given that the Defendants have not identified any 
provision of the Tips Act that expressly or impliedly 
allows employers to ban tipping, their contention that 
the Tips Act permits tipping bans poses another 
troubling problem: "[I]t requires [this Court] to add 
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words to the statute that the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there." Cooney v. Compass Group 
Foodservice, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 638 (2007) 
(interpreting ch.149, §152A prior to a 2004 
Legislative amendment). 
There is, of course, language in the Tips Act 
that shields certain tip-related employer practices 
from sanction. In 2004, the Legislature amended the 
Tips Act by adding §152A(d) to expressly permit 
employers to impose a "house or administrative fee in 
addition to or instead of a service charge or tip" as 
long as "the employer provides a designation or 
written description of that house or administrative 
fee, which informs the patron that the fee does not 
represent a tip or service charge intended" for 
protected employees. See Bednark v. Catania 
Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 808 n. 
8 and 812 ( 2 0 11 ) . 
By creating §152A(d), which the Appeals Court 
labeled as a "safe harbor provision," the Legislature 
indicated that it knew how to craft provisions to 
protect certain employer business practices that 
operate in the sphere of conduct that the Tips Act 
regulates. See Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 808 n. 8 
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and 812. However, unlike the express safe harbor 
provision in §152A(d), no section of the Tips Act 
contains any language condoning, permitting or 
creating safe harbor for employer policies that would 
punish a protected employee who accepted a patron's 
tip or permit an employer to post signs banning 
voluntary tipping of employees by patrons. For this 
reason, and contrary to the Superior Court's view, 
"clearly and conspicuously announced" no-tipping 
policies are in no way consistent with the Tips Act. 
See Meshna v. Scrivanos, Memorandum of Decision and 
Order on Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 313, at *2, C.A. No. 
2011-01849-BLS1 (J. Fabricant Dec. 21, 2011). 
In short, no part of §152A(a), which defines who 
is a covered employee and what constitutes a tip, 
provides support for the argument that an employer can 
take it upon itself to decide whether covered 
employees are entitled to receive tips voluntarily 
offered by patrons. See Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 
809 (quoting DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 486) (language and 
history of Tips Act indicate Legislature's intent: "to 
ensure that service employees receive the tips, 
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gratuities, and service charges that customers intend 
them to receive") (emphasis in original). 
B. Employer-Imposed No-Tipping Policies 
Conflict with the Tip Act's Prohibition of 
Employers' Efforts to Exempt Themselves from 
the Law. 
Scrivanos' no-tipping policy is also at odds with 
§152A(g) of the Tips Act, which was added by the 
Legislature in 2004 to strengthen the statutory 
provision in the original Tips Act that "rendered 
unenforceable" employer-initiated agreements that 
required employees to turn their tips over to the 
employer. DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 493. Section 152A(g) 
now provides even broader protections, stating that 
"[n]o employer or person shall by a special contract 
with an employee or by any other means exempt itself 
from this section." 
This Court has repeatedly explained that by 
enacting §152A(g) "the Legislature was cognizant, in 
general, of the risk that employers or other persons 
may seek to find ways [ ... ] to attempt to avoid 
compliance with the Act, and intended to thwart such 
schemes." DeFiore, 454 Mass. at 497; see also 
DePianti, 465 Mass. at 623 (2013). More specifically, 
DeFiore held that 152A(g) banned a subcontracting 
16 
scheme that restaurants and airlines used "to avoid 
the mandates of the statute by outsourcing the 
services of wait staff and service employees, and 
contractually requiring the outsource employer to 
remit to the restaurant or airlines all or part of the 
service charges." 454 Mass. at 496. This practice was 
found to be an unlawful "end-run" around the Tips Act. 
Id. 
Scrivanos' no-tipping policy is yet another 
"end run" around the Tips Act that cannot be squared 
with §152A(g)'s ban on the use of "special contracts" 
or "any other means" to exempt employers from the 
requirements of the Tips Act. Whether termed a 
"special contract" or some "other means" of thwarting 
the Act's goal, Scrivanos' ban on tipping cannot be 
squared with a sensible reading of §152A(g), a 
provision intended to ensure that covered employees 
receive tips intended for them by patrons. See 
DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 490-491 (further citations 
omitted) (rejecting interpretations of the Tips Act 
that ignore judicially-approved use of language, 
statutory purpose and the employer mischief to be 
remedied). 
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Yet, Scrivanos' no-tipping rule is indisputably 
part of his employees' at-will contracts. It is 
included in the franchises' personnel handbooks and 
posted in public areas of its Dunkin' Donuts stores. 
Defendants also reserve the right to punish wait staff 
employees if they accept a tip intended for them by a 
patron or if they fail to convey the no-tipping policy 
to patrons who leave change on the counter, intending 
it to be a tip. Indeed, Scrivanos has fired employees 
for violating this contractual term of employment. 
Meshna v. Scrivanos, Memorandum of Decision and Order 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, SUCV2011-
01849-BLS1 at 9, 10. 
The no-tipping policy is surely a contractual 
means of banning tipping as it imposes no enforceable 
rule on patrons, only on Dunkin' Donuts wait staff. 
Nothing in the record indicates that, pursuant to its 
no-tipping policy, Scrivanos reserved the right to 
exclude or remove patrons who intend to or in fact do 
leave tips for wait staff. As such, the no-tipping 
signs at Scrivanos' Dunkin' Donuts are no more than a 
public display of its employment policy that serves 
the purpose of putting its wait staff on notice that 
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they may be punished or terminated for receiving a 
gratuity from a patron. 
Notably, neither Scrivanos' brief nor the 
Superior Court's rulings reference, much less attempt 
to reconcile, the no-tipping policy at issue 
wit§152A(g). Rather, the Superior Court decision 
skirted §152A{g) and adopted Scrivanos' argument that 
an employer can choose to create a tip-free zone at 
its restaurant to avoid "the administrative burden of 
accounting for tips and distributing them among those 
employees entitled to receive them" or to avoid "the 
risk of liability" for violations of the Tips Act. 
Meshna, Memorandum of Decision and Order on 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 29 
Mass. L. Rptr. 313 at *3-4 & n. 3. Finding no support 
for this argument in the statutory text, the Superior 
Court illogically cites DiFiore and Bednark to support 
its assertion that, "conspicuously announced," no-
tipping policies preclude any reasonable customer 
expectations that money offered as tips would "go to 
employees." Id. at *2. 
The Superior Court's reasoning should be rejected 
as it misapprehends the analysis in DiFiore and 
Bednark. The underlying concern in DiFiore, 454 Mass. 
19 
at 494, and Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 815, was to 
outlaw employer mislabeling of service fees that 
misled customers by suggesting to them that the fees 
they paid to the employer were gratuities intended for 
covered employees. 
More specifically, DiFiore addressed the proper 
definition of the term "service charge" in §152A(a) in 
response to a certified question from a Massachusetts 
Federal District Court. 454 Mass. at 487. This Court 
explained that the proper starting point in defining 
this term was to recognize that "the Legislature 
intended to ensure that service employees receive all 
the proceeds from service charges." 454 Mass. at 493 
(finding that the Legislature wished definitions to be 
interpreted to serve, not thwart, legislative purpose 
underlying Tips Act). Accordingly, DiFiore rejected 
definitions of the terms "service charge" and 
"employer" that would have permitted an airline to use 
a subcontracting scheme to avoid remitting a service 
charge to baggage handlers. Id. at 494. 
In Bednark, a hotel employer argued that any 
charge to patrons designated by the employer as an 
"administrative fee" is by definition not a gratuity 
or service charge as defined by §152A(a), which allows 
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the employer to retain the fee pursuant to §152A(d), 
the Tip Act's safe harbor provision. 78 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 815-816. Accordingly, this Court held that the 
hotel could not take advantage of §152A(d) when it 
charged customers for certain costs that it blithely 
labeled as an "administrative fee," without further 
written explanation or description. Id. at 806. 
Scrivanos' no-tipping policy receives neither 
support nor protection from DiFiore or Bednark, both 
of which condemned employer mislabeling schemes and 
policies that thwarted the ability of patrons to leave 
gratuities for covered employees if that is their 
intent. See Bednark, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 815-816 
(requiring various provisions of Tips Act be 
interpreted harmoniously to preserve their "patron-
centric focus"). The Dunkin' Donuts no-tipping policy 
- whether or not it is conspicuously announced to 
patrons or clearly conveyed to employees - has the 
same unlawful effect on patron behavior and the right 
of covered employees to receive gratuities as the 
employer schemes rejected by DiFiore and Bednark, 
i.e., it prevents patrons from offering, and covered 
employees from receiving, tips. 
21 
What the trial court's defense of Scrivanos' no-
tipping policy fails to recognize is that the Tips 
Act, like all wage and hour legislation, contains 
provisions that abrogate certain aspects of the at-
will employment contract, to wit, the employer's right 
to impose on its employees certain terms of the wage 
bargain that are contrary to statutory enactment and 
underlying legislative policy. Parrish v. West Coast 
Hotel, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937); Akins Case, 302 Mass. 
562, 566-567 ( 193 9) (contractual terms of employment 
are subordinate to right of the State to safeguard the 
public interest). Here, §152A(g) states that employers 
may not "by special contract [ ... ] or other means 
exempt itself" from the Tips Act. Given this clear 
language, "it is the function of the judiciary to 
apply it, not amend it." Cooney, 439 Mass. App. Ct. at 
638 (quoting Commissioner of Rev. v. Cargill, 429 
Mass. 79, 82 (1999)). 
II. THE TIPS ACT DOES NOT SANCTION EMPLOYER NO-
TIPPING POLICIES AS A LAWFUL BUSINESS RESPONSE TO 
CUSTOMER DEMAND OR PREFERENCE 
The argument that the Tips Act permits employer-
imposed tipping bans is, in effect, an attempt to 
repurpose the Tips Act to serve private policy 
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objectives that are at odds with the legislative goals 
underlying the Commonwealth's wage and hour laws. 
Scrivanos contends that employers should be allowed to 
ban tipping "primarily in response to concerns voiced 
by [. .] customers who did not want to feel 
pressured to leave tips and wanted to receive the same 
service regardless of their ability or desire to leave 
a tip." Scrivanos Brief at 6. However, Scrivanos 
offers slim anecdotal evidence and virtually no case 
law or any legislative policy to support the view that 
no-tipping policies may be enacted because some 
patrons do not like to tip. 
A. When Viewed in a Light Most Favorable to the 
Plaintiffs, the Record Cannot Be Construed 
to Support the Notion That Tipping Bans Are 
a Reasoned Business Response to Market 
Forces. 
Defendants' argument conveniently ignores the 
undisputed fact that over one-third of the Dunkin' 
Donuts franchises they own permit tipping. Meshna 
Brief at 7. Notably, there is no claim that these 
stores suffered any economic disadvantage. What's 
more, Scrivanos offers no explanation for why it 
disregards the viewpoint of those customers who choose 
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to leave tips when patronizing Dunkin Donuts stores, 
even when they are informed of the no-tipping policy. 
Instead, Defendants contend that its no-tipping 
policy is a reasoned business response to some of its 
customers' 'discomfort' with, and/or viewpoints 
regarding, customary tipping. Basing one's business 
practices on customer preferences that compel 
violation of extant workplace laws is, however, 
without legal support. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts Co., 
452 Mass. 674 (2008) (rejecting employer's undue 
hardship defense; holding customer preferences for 
clean-shaven employees does not justify employer 
engaging in religious discrimination against unshaven 
Rastafarian) . 
B. The Facts and Historical Practice Establish 
that Coffee Servers and Counter Wait Staff 
Customarily Receive Tips from Patrons. 
The record does not support Scrivanos' claim that 
customary tipping has not taken root at Dunkin' Donuts 
and other establishments where employees serve 
beverages from behind the counter (as opposed to 
waiting on tables) . A brief review of the origins and 
history of the custom of tipping explains why 
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Scrivanos cannot substantiate the claim that it is not 
"customary" to offer gratuities to coffee servers. 
The centuries-old custom of tipping can be traced 
to Tudor England where overnight guests provided a sum 
of money directly to their host's servants as 
compensation for the extra work of caring for more 
than the usual number of guests. Kerry Seagrave, TIPPING 
AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY OF GRATUITIES, 1- 6 ( 19 9 8) The 
practice soon made its way to coffeehouses, 
restaurants and other commercial establishments. Id. 
at 4. In fact, some historians believe that the term 
"tip" is an acronym for the phrase 'To Insure 
Promptitude," which English author Samuel Johnson 
inscribed on a bowl at a coffeehouse he frequented in 
the 1700's. Id. 2 
Wealthier Americans began the custom of tipping 
after the Civil War, perhaps as a means of 
demonstrating their familiarity with and approval of 
European customs. Steve Dublanica, KEEP THE CHANGE: A 
CLUELESS TIPPERS QUEST TO BECOME THE GURU OF THE GRATUITY, 15 -16 
2 0ther historians consider the Samuel Johnson/tips acronym 
story to be an early urban myth. Steve Dublanica, author of 
KEEP THE CHANGE: A CLUELESS TIPPERS QUEST TO BECOME THE GURU OF THE 
GRATUITY (2010), claims that the term tip has an older 
origin. "As far back as 1509, Albrecht Durer, the German 
painter and printer, wrote a letter asking one of his 
customers to give his apprentice a trinkgeld, or tip." Id. 
at 14. 
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(2010). Although tipping was a controversial social 
practice when introduced to America - as it was 
thought to be an anathema to a society founded on 
social equality - by 1926, tipping had become a norm 
in America's food service industry. 3 Yoram Margailoth, 
The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP L. 117, 
121 (2006) . 
Even legal scholars who question the social 
utility of tipping recognize that it is now customary 
for patrons served by low-wage counter-staff and 
baristas at the innumerable coffee bars and juice 
joints that now pepper America's downtowns and 
shopping areas. See, e.g., id. at 121 (2006) ("Tipping 
has become quintessentially American" and "in today's 
coffeehouses and juice joints, with their 'tip jars,' 
[tipping] has become de rigueur") . 4 Moreover, the 
3 The restaurant industry quickly took advantage of the 
custom of tipping and generally required wait staff to live 
on tips alone. In fact, the restaurant industry has a long 
history of hostility to minimum wage laws, lobbying 
Congress to deny restaurant employees coverage under FLSA. 
Tips and Poverty, New York Times, Op-ed, Sept. 14,2013 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/tips-and-
poverty.html?_r=O. Only in 1966, when the FLSA was amended, 
did a 'sub-minimum' wage -then set at fifty percent of the 
minimum wage - become required for wait-staff to supplement 
tipped earnings. See 29 U.S.C. §203(m). 
4 see also Emily Post, iconic mainstay of American 
etiquette, stating on its website: "Tip occasionally if 
your server or barista provides a little something extra or 
if you are a regular customer." Emily Post General Tipping 
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ubiquity of tipping in over-the-counter coffee service 
restaurants is consistent with the record in this 
case, which is peppered with facts indicating that 
Dunkin' patrons routinely attempted to tip employees, 
even in the face of Scrivanos' no-tipping policies. 
See infra at 35-37. 
Furthermore, neither the record in this case or 
social science research supports the view that the 
practice of customary tipping is on the way out. 
Rather, new forms of digital commerce are now being 
shaped by patrons' strong desire to leave tips for 
low-wage coffee servers and other behind-the-counter 
wait staff. Most notably, Starbucks has included a 
mobile-tipping option on the newest version of its 
smartphone "app," responding to "demand from 
customers, many of who no longer carry around much 
cash." Candace Choi, Tipping Can Be Touchy, But App 
Wi 11 Make it Easy, BOSTON GLOBE/ ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 
13,2014, 2014 WLNR 6815972 (mobile-tipping, in amounts 
of fifty cents, one dollar or two dollars, is an 
option at 7,000 out of 11,000 Starbucks nationwide as 
of March 19, 2014). 
Guidelines, http://www.emilypost.com/ out-and-
about/tipping/89-general-tipping-guidelines (last visited 
April 12, 2014). 
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In sum, there is no support in the law, the facts 
of this dispute or in social science literature for 
the view that patrons do not customarily tip at 
Dunkin' Donuts franchise outlets or other similarly 
situated over-the-counter, quick service, food and 
beverage restaurants. 
III. NO-TIPPING POLICIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE LOW-WAGE WORKFORCE AND 
FOIST THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF TIPPING 
BANS ONTO THE CITIZEN-TAX PAYERS OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Scrivanos' argument that employers of food 
service wait staff should enjoy the unfettered right 
to create no-tipping zones in their establishments 
callously ignores the fact that no-tipping policies 
will surely depress the already meager income of 
thousands of low-wage, front-line wait staff and food 
service workers throughout Massachusetts. Moreover, 
no-tipping policies that lower the earned income of 
behind-the-counter wait staff have hidden social costs 
that increase the number of low-wage workers driven to 
depend on myriad federal and state public assistance 
programs. 
28 
A. Socio-Economic Data Establishes That Tips 
Received by Dunkin' Donuts Wait Staff and 
Other Similarly Situated Workers Are an 
Important Part of Employee Compensation. 
Any inquiry into the real-world impact of no-
tipping policies invites close examination of the 
restaurant industry, which employs over 10 million 
workers or 9 percent of the total U.S. workforce. 
According to the National Restaurant Association 
(NRA), the industry is thriving; total sales revenues 
for 2013 was $660.5 billion, almost double the 
industry's revenues in 2000. Rosemary Batt, et al., A 
National Study of Human Resource Practices, Turnover 
and Customer Service in the Restaurant Industry 5, 
http://rocunited.org/a-national-study-of-human-
resource-practices-turnover-and-customer-service-in-
the-restaurant-industry/ (citing National Restaurant 
Association website 2013; U.S. DOL, Bureau of Labor 
Standards 2012) (last visited March 17, 2014) 
[hereinafter "ROC United Restaurant Study"]. 
Yet, seven of the ten lowest-paid occupations are 
in restaurant occupations. Id. (citing DOL, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data) . The average yearly income for 
restaurant workers nationwide in 2009 was $15,092, 
compared to $45,155 for the total private sector. 
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Median hourly wage in the industry, including tips, is 
only $8.89. ROC United, Behind the Kitchen Door: A 
Multi-site Study of the Restaurant Industry, 
http://rocunited.org/2011-behind-the-kitchen-door-
multi-site-study/ (2011) (last visited on October 15, 
2014). Moreover, low pay in this industry has had a 
disparate impact on racial minorities. According to 
ROC United's survey in eight major urban areas, the 
disparity in the median wage of whites as compared to 
workers of color is $13.59 as compared to $9.54. This 
$3.71 per hour differential is stark evidence of 
widespread racial inequality in the restaurant 
industry. Id. 5 
The vast majority of restaurant workers, 87 
percent, have no sick leave. Id. And the large number 
of low wage jobs in this sector makes the restaurant 
industry "particularly prone to minimum wage and hours 
of work violations." David Weil, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: 
WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 
5 The wages of restaurant workers are also substantially 
lower than the wages earned by demographically similar 
workers in other industries. Percentage-wise, a typical 
restaurant worker suffers a 'wage penalty' for working in 
this industry of 17.2 percent. Heidi Shierholz, Low wages 
and few Benefits mean many restaurant workers can't make 
ends meet, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #383, 
16-17, http://www.epi.org/publication/restaurant-
workers/(last visited on August 29, 2014). 
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IMPROVE IT, 130 (2014) (18.2 percent experience minimum 
wage violations; 69.7 percent overtime violations; 
74.2 percent off-the-clock violations; also non-
compliance with wage and hour laws higher in 
franchised outlets); see also Behind the Kitchen Door, 
supra, at 29 (almost half of restaurant workers 
surveyed report overtime violations) . 
The restaurant industry's high-profit/low-wage 
business model is most pronounced in the fast-
food/quick service sector where the ten largest 
companies employ more than 2.25 million mostly low-
wage workers while earning profits of $7.44 billion in 
2013. Super-sizing Public Costs: How Low Wages at 
Fast-Food Chains Leave Taxpayers Footing the Bill, 
National Employment Law Project Data Brief, 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/rtmw/uploads/NELP-Super-
Sizing-Public-Costs-Fast-Food-Report.pdf?nocdn=1, 
Oct., 2013 (last visited October 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter "Super-sizing Public Costs"]. Dunkin' 
Donuts ranks sixth on that list, employing more than 
160,000 employees at over 7300 franchise outlets 
nationwide. Id. 
Dunkin' Donut employees and other front-line 
fast-food service workers, comprise the very bottom of 
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the restaurant industry's low-wage workforce. This is 
the conclusion of a 2013 national study undertaken by 
the University of California, Berkeley, Center for 
Labor Research and Education and the Department of 
Urban and Regional Planning, University of Illinois 
(Urbana-Champaign) . See Sylvia A. Allegretto, PhD, et 
al., Fast Food, Poverty Wages: The Public Cost of Low-
Wage Jobs in the Fast-Food Industry, http:// 
laborcenter.berkeley.edu/publiccosts/fast_food 
_poverty_wages.pdf (last visited March 13, 2014) 
[hereinafter "Fast Food, Poverty Wages"] . 
Consider that in 2010 the typical fast-food 
worker lucky enough to work a 40-hour week for an 
entire year makes only $18,130. 6 Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational 
Outlook Handbook, 2014-15 Edition, Food and Beverage 
Serving and Related Workers, http://www.bls.gov/ 
ooh/food-preparation-and-serving/food-and-beverage-
6 The Massachusetts Economic Independence Index estimates 
that an adult in Massachusetts needs to earn about $28,500 
annually to remain economically independent, and a single-
parent family with one preschooler and one school-age 
child needs an income of $65,880 a year to meet its day-to-
day essential expenses without public assistance. Michael 
W. Ames, et al., Massachusetts Economic Independence Index, 
Crittenton Women's Union, http://www.liveworkthrive.org/ 
research_and_tools/reports_and_publications/Massachusetts_E 
conomic_Independence_Index_2013 (last visited March 18, 
2014) . 
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serving-and-related-workers.htm (visited October 15, 
2014). But, for the vast majority of this workforce, 
full-time work is the exception rather than the rule. 
Less than a third - just 28 percent - of front-line 
fast-food workers work a 40-hour week. Id. at 8-9. The 
median workweek is actually far less, only 30 hours, 
and 12 percent of the fast-food workforce is employed 
for only 10-20 hours per week, compared to 4 percent 
of the total workforce. The median wage for Dunkin' 
Donuts employees and other front-line fast-food 
workers is $8.69 an hour. 7 Only 13 percent of these 
workers receive employer-provided health care, 
compared to 59 percent of the overall workforce. Id. 
As a consequence of this low-wage, no-benefit and 
limited, low-hours business model, households that 
include an employed, front-line fast-food worker are 
four times as likely to live below the federal poverty 
level. 8 See id. (5 percent of households in poverty 
compared to 20 percent for households with fast-food 
workers) . Not surprisingly, fast-food and quick 
7 This figure is for a front-line fast-food worker employed 
for at least 27 weeks per year and 10 hours per week. Fast 
Food, Poverty Wages at 8. As discussed, for most fast-food 
workers, the 40-hour workweek is beyond their reach. 
8 The federal poverty level for a family of four is $23,850 
and $11,670 for a single person. U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, http://aspe.hhs.gov /poverty/14poverty.cfm 
(last visited May 19, 2014). 
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service restaurants have annual employee turnover 
rates of 45 percent and the typical tenure is only 3.6 
years, creating inordinate levels of churning and wage 
loss in the low-wage workforce and increased business 
costs for franchise owners. See Roc United Restaurant 
Study at 2, 17-20. 
Contrary to popular wisdom, the fast-food 
workforce is not primarily comprised of teenagers and 
'stay-at-home-moms,' whose earnings are supplemental 
to their families' primary source of income. Over two-
thirds of the front-line fast-food workers are single 
or married adults. Id. at 10. The average age is 
twenty-four and more than one-third of fast-food this 
workers over twenty years old are raising children. 
Id. at 9-10. 
Given the pervasive poverty-level and near-
poverty level incomes of fast-food workers at 
franchise outlets of Dunkin' Donuts, McDonald's, 
Subway, Domino's and other franchised quick-service 
restaurants, it is patent that any amount received in 
tips can make a significant difference in employee 
earnings. This is evident from the judgment in 
Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 2011 WL 1002740 (D. 
Mass. March 18, 2011), aff'd. 699 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 
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2012), in which Starbucks wait staff received a $14 
million judgment to remedy Starbucks violation of 
§152A(c) of the Tips Act by unlawfully including 
supervisory employees in tip pools. This sum -
premised on Starbucks coffee servers earning an 
additional $2 per hour in tips - provides a useful 
comparator to assess the potential income that Dunkin 
Donuts' workers are losing as a result of Scrivanos' 
no-tipping policy. See Matamoros, Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Damages, C.A. No. 1:08-cv-
10772, Dkt. No 79. 9 An employee receiving tips 
amounting to $2 per hour would increase her yearly 
earnings by $3,000 if that fast-food worker was 
employed for 30 hours a week. Indeed, this is a 25 
percent hourly raise for a fast - food worker making the 
minimum wage of $8/hour. 
The undisputed testimony of the Plaintiffs in 
this case provides further reason to reject Scrivanos' 
claim that tips are not "an important part" of 
9 Moreover, following the First Circuit's ruling, Starbucks 
increased the starting wage for shift supervisors in its 
Massachusetts outlets by almost $3 per hour (from $11.00 to 
$13.89) in order to make up for the tips that supervisors 
could no longer earn. Lisa Jennings, Starbucks restructures 
'shift supervisor' position in Mass., NATION's RESTAURANT NEWS , 
http://nrn.com/latest-headlines/starbucks-restructures -
shift-supervisor-position-mass, Jan. 29, 2013 (last visited 
March 17, 2014) . 
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employee compensation at his Dunkin' Donuts stores. 
See Scrivanos Brief at 23 (Dunkin' Donuts employees do 
not "rely on tips as part of their compensation"). Ron 
Meshna indicated that patrons would leave tips ranging 
from a penny to five dollars at the North Reading 
Dunkin' store. Meshna v. Scrivanos, Memorandum of 
Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, C.A. No. 2011-01849-BLS1 at 13 (Sept. 11, 
2013 Billings, J.) 
Ralph Sherrick stated that at the Dunkin' Donuts 
Peabody location "on many occasions" patrons left 
money on the counter and told him to "keep the 
change." Id. at 14. In the Lynnfield Dunkin' Donuts 
store, Ileana Ortiz reported that customers would 
insist on leaving change at the drive-in window and on 
the counter even when told that tips were "not 
allowed." Id. at 14-15. In Haverhill's Dunkin' Donuts, 
Karen White indicates that regular customers who live 
in the neighborhood and frequent the store routinely, 
came in at Christmas time and gave "substantial tips 
because they knew we had been providing them with good 
service." Id. at 15. 
The evolution of Scrivanos' "Abandoned Change Cup" 
policy underscores just how prevalent and potentially 
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substantial tip income from Dunkin' Donuts patrons 
could be. See generally id. at 16-18. When so-called 
"abandoned change" cups were first placed on the 
counter in the Peabody Dunkin' Donuts store, patrons 
responded generously as they thought the cups were for 
leaving tips. See id. (Sherrick was instructed "at 
least once" by management to empty "an overflowing 
abandoned change cup into the register"). 
It was only after management put signs on the cups 
indicating they were not for tips that, "[a]fter a few 
days [. .] , the problem of overflowing change in the 
cups ceased." Id. at 17. The fact that it took "a few 
days" to quell the flow of change indicates that, even 
when management attempted to stop the practice, 
customers still demonstrated a desire to tip Dunkin' 
Donuts wait staff. 
B. Employer-Imposed Tipping Bans Have Hidden 
Public Costs That Burden Social Safety Net 
Programs Administered and Funded by 
Commonwealth Taxpayers. 
The low wages and insufficient work hours of wait 
staff employees in fast-food restaurants also have 
hidden social costs that are not reflected in the 
record of this case. More than half of front-line 
fast-food workers rely on one or more public 
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assistance programs to support themselves and their 
families. Fast Food, Poverty Wages at 1, 6-9. Fast-
food workers participate in these programs at more 
than twice the rate of all employed workers. In other 
words, "public benefits receipt is the rule, rather 
than the exception for this workforce." Id. at 6, 10. 
The cost to taxpayers is staggering: almost $7 
billion is spent each year to provide federally 
sponsored public assistance programs to families of 
workers in the fast-food industry. Id. More than 
432,000 families of fast-food workers (a 45 percent 
participation rate) receive $1.04 billion in food 
stamps. Id. at 7. Over 800,000 families of fast-food 
workers use the Earned Income Tax Credit, costing 
taxpayers $1.91 billion. Medicaid participation for 
families of fast - food workers with adult enrollment is 
19 percent and for families with children it is 18 
percent. The cost for both is almost $4 billion a 
year. 
In fact, U.S. taxpayers underwrite the low-wages 
paid to Dunkin' Donuts wait staff in the amount of 
$274 million in annual public assistance benefits. 
Super-sizing Public Costs, supra, at 31. That breaks 
down to $1704 for each of the more than 7000 employees 
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at Dunkin' franchise outlets. It takes little 
imagination to understand that employer-imposed 
tipping bans can only contribute to raising the hidden 
public costs that taxpayers assume for the already low 
wages paid to quick service coffee servers and other 
fast-food workers. 
No-tipping policies and employer appropriation of 
employee tips are part and parcel of a pattern of wage 
and hour law violations that are now endemic in the 
restaurant industry. Just last fiscal year, the Boston 
office of the U.S. Department of Labor conducted 165 
investigations into the restaurant industry that 
resulted in more than $1.7 million in back wages. See 
For many Restaurant Workers, Fair Conditions Not on 
Menu, THE BosToN GLOBE, op-ed, Feb. 16, 2 014, 2 014 WLNR 
4274642. Consider in this light the patent violations 
of the Tips Act that accompanied Scrivanos' no-tipping 
policies: demands that Dunkin' Donuts employees "throw 
tips into the garbage"; employer use of tips to 
purportedly cover employee theft and "shortages" in 
the cash register; and pouring entire cups of money 
into the cash register that were unquestionably 
intended as tips for wait staff. See generally Meshna, 
39 
Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, SUCV2011-01849-BLS1 at 5-19. 
The economic realities of this industry lend no 
support to any meaningful argument that tipping bans 
are born of business necessity. Competitive pressures 
do not explain the low-road economic model in the 
restaurant sector; the industry is expanding and is 
largely immune from the downward push that 
international competition creates in other economic 
sectors. See For Many Restaurant Workers, Fair 
Conditions Not on Menu, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2014, 
2014 WLNR 4274642. 
The record in this dispute underscores the Globe 
editors' point; low-road employment practices "do not 
represent an efficient, market-driven distribution of 
labor." Id. As Judge Billings noted, the no-tipping 
policy actually placed Defendants at a competitive 
disadvantage in the labor market of the Metro West 
suburbs. Meshna, Memorandum of Decision and Order on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, n. 5. 
This resulted in the Defendants withdrawing the no -
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tipping policy at some of its Dunkin outlets "after 
receiving pressure from his operations people." Id. 10 
In fact, no-tipping policies compromise the well -
being of the Commonwealth's low-wage workforce and 
burden its taxpayers. See Parrish v. West Coast Hotel, 
300 U . S. at 399-400 (in which the Supreme Court 
famously stated that "[t]he community is not bound to 
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable 
employers"). It is often forgotten that wage and hour 
laws were enacted in the first part of the twentieth 
century as part of an industrial policy to end 
widespread poverty and cycles of economic decline that 
accompanied the modern economy. See Marc Linder, The 
Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 
16 J. OF LEGIS. 151, 151-153 (1990). President Franklin 
Roosevelt, in his advocacy for the minimum wage, made 
this policy goal very clear by bluntly stating, "No 
business which depends for existence on paying less 
than living wages to its workers has any right to 
10 The genesis of Scrivanos' withdrawal of his no-tipping 
policy at some stores is explained by Judge Billings: "The 
problem was that most of the surrounding Dunkin' Donuts 
stores in the Metrowest area allowing [sic] tipping, so the 
defendants could not find any people to work at his stores, 
notwithstanding that they paid employees above minimum wage 
and spent over a hundred thousand dollars in advertising. 
Scrivanos was even forced to close some stores for want of 
staff." Id. 
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continue to exist in this country." Robert Follin, et 
al . 1 A MEASURE OF FAIRNESS : THE ECONOMICS OF LIVING WAGES AND 
MINIMUM WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 4 ( 2 0 0 8) • 
Tipped income is a lifeline for many because 
minimum wage jobs are not lifting workers out of 
poverty and squalor, much less allowing workers to 
live adequately in any major U.S. metropolis. The 
living wage in Boston, which is now calculated at 
$12.65 per hour for a single individual and $22.40 for 
a family of four, is almost 60 per cent higher than 
the Commonwealth's minimum wage. 11 See Living Wage 
Calculation for Boston, MA., http://livingwage. 
mit.edu /places/2502507000(prepared by Dr. Amy K. 
Glasmeier and MIT) (last visited March 18, 2014). 
However, allowing wait staff to receive patron tips 
without employer interference, as envisioned by the 
Tips Act and this Court's precedent, provides -- at no 
cost to the employer - an immediate, meaningful boost 
in earnings for these workers. 
11 Legislation increasing the Massachusetts m~n~mum wage is 
scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2015. However, the 
minimum wage will not reach even $11 per hour until January 
2017. An Act Restoring the Minimum Wage and Providing 
Unemployment Insurance Reforms, Ch. 144, §§ 28-36 of the 
Acts of the General Court, June 26, 2014. 
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Given the real impact that tipped income has on 
earnings, this Court should reject employer no-tipping 
policies, not only because they conflict with the text 
and purpose of the Tips Act but also because tipping 
bans serve no rational public policy goal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Superior Court's 
rulings and find that the Defendants' no-tipping 
policy violates Section 152A of Chapter 149 of the 
General Laws, effectively discouraging patrons from 
leaving tips for protected wait staff employees and 
prohibiting employees from accepting tips. 
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